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TilE PRODUCTION, DISCOVERY AND INSPEC-
TION OF WRITTEN EVIDENCE IN
NEW YORK
PEILIE P. FALLON*
The fundamental, basic requirement of any system of administer-
ing justice is that the court shall have before it all material and
necessary evidence on the issues to be tried. There should be no
hindrance to either party bringing in evidence. Fundamental neces-
sity gives a special application to the production of evidence where
the issues turn upon written or documentary proof. Such was the
point which the New York legislature sought to cover in the provi-
sions of Section 324 of the Civil Practice Act.' This legislation,
remedial in intention, has, by a balance of convenience in particular
cases, become so involved in its application that even as to a partic-
ular litigant, namely, an employee in an action against an em-
ployer, the relief is granted in one case while in another it is denied.2
The petitioner in moving for relief under the statute may have
different motives. He may use the motion for the harassment of his
adversary, but he also may seek to get and establish evidence which
he knows in good faith to exist and which is material to the action.
This defines the necessary but exact field of the court's discretion.
The conflict within this field of discretion is more apparent than real
when we consider that justice, which is done on the basis of the
actual evidence that exists, sweeps away far more difficulties for
*Member of the New York Bar.
1N. Y. Civ. PRAC. AcT, § 324 provides: "A court of record, other than a justices'
court in a city, by order may compel a party to an action pending therein to
produce and discover, or to give to the other party, an inspection and copy, or
permission to take a copy or photograph of a book, document, or other paper,
or to make discovery of any article or property, in his possession or under his
control, relating to the merits of the action, or of the defense therein. The pro-
cedure for obtaining such order shall be regulated by rules."
2Employees are generally denied the right of discovery and inspection on the
ground that a former employee may not be permitted to examine his master's
books. Strauss v. Von Tobel, 131 App. Div. 823, zi6 N. Y. Supp. 95 (ist Dept.
19o9). But where there is a contract by which payment is based on a percentage
of profits the discovery is allowed. Webb v. Homer W. Hedge Co., 133 App. Div.
420, 117 N. Y. Supp. 643 (2d Dept. i909); Bums v. Lipson, 204 App. Div. 643,
198 N. Y. Supp. 8io (2d Dept. 1923). In addition to all of this, the various
departments of the Appellate Division are not in agreement among themselves.
See Strauss v. Von Tobel, supra, and Clynne v. Scharf Bros. & Sons, 213 App.
Div. 286, 21O N. Y. Supp. 338 (2d Dept. 1925). See also Klink v. Hershon, 19l
App. Div. 5o4, 181 N. Y. Supp. 459 (ist Dept. 1920) for a further rule where
the plaintiff or employee is working for a competitor.
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itself and litigants than it can possibly create. The point may be
entirely disposed of by requiring a showing that the documents
sought relate to the merits. An application of this principle to the
examination of partnership books was made in the recent case of
Sanderson v. Cooke.3
The statutes which control the production of written evidence in
New York grew out of the equity rules and provisions relating to
discovery.4 These statutes were intended to sweep away the older
technicalities. The courts, however, in using the discretion vested
in them, have gone further than a determination of the good faith
of the petition and have retained many of the old forms and limita-
tions thereby making them a part of the statutes.5 While remedial in
nature the statutes have been encrusted with old limitations-for
example, many cases hold that the relief must be denied where there
is any showing that the petitioner has any knowledge of the evidence
sought.6 Thus the ancient theory of informatory discovery blocks
the establishment of proof. Yet knowledge of evidence and the
proper presentation of it in a trial court are entirely different matters.
The New York Civil Practice Act makes explicit provision that a
court of record, other than a justice's court in a city, may compel a
party to produce and give an inspection of any article or property
in his possession or control relating to the merits of the action and
including the right to take a copy or photograph of a book or docu-
ment.
7
3256 N. Y. 73, 175 N. E. 518 (i93i).
4This history is summarized by Chief Judge Cardozo in People v. Supreme
Court, 245 N. Y. 24, 28, i56 N. E. 84 (1927). The action for discovery is abolished,
N. Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT, § 345.
5A summary of the former limitations may be found in Murphy v. Keenan,
ioi Misc. 443, 167 N. Y. Supp. 55 (Sup. Ct. 1917). It is in itself a remedial de-
cision. After stating the limitations of the existing procedure, the court says, at
447, 167 N. Y. Supp. at 57: ". . but we are not now so tender of the rules of pro-
cedure, and are giving more heed to the discovery of truth and the adminis-
tration of justice." The relief was granted as asked. The RULEs OF CivIt
PRACticE became effective on Oct. I, 1921. Rule I4O, as pointed out in Bell v.
Frank Gilbert Paper Co., 117 Misc. 61o, 193 N. Y. Supp. 26 (Sup. Ct. 1922),
adff', 2oi App. Div. 867, 193 N. Y. Supp. 925 (3d Dept. 1922), was intended
to materially enlarge the scope of procedure directed to the discovery and in-
spection of evidence. However, we still find cases decided after the adoption
of Rule I4O where the limitations stated and disapproved in Murphy v. Keenan,
supra, are applied and that case cited as an authority. See Bencoe v. M'Donnell,
21o App. Div. 123, 205 N. Y. Supp. 343 (2d Dept. 1924).
6Ferguson v. Bien, 49 Misc. 450, 97 N. Y. Supp. 986 (Sup. Ct. 19o6); Bencoe v.
M'Donnell, supra note 5; Cross v. Bishop Oil Corp., 218 App. Div. 632, 219 N.
Y. Supp. 181 (2d Dept. 1926). 7Supra note I.
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Pursuant to the statute the Supreme Court has promulgated rules
regulating the procedure. These require that the application shall be
made by an order to show cause why the production, discovery and
inspection should not be granted. The moving affidavit must show
that the material is not under the control or in the possession of the
petitioner, but is in the possession and control of the party, including
an agent or attorney, to whom the order is directed 8 It is further pro-
vided that upon the hearing the court will make such a direction "as
justice requires," and a stay in the discretion of the court is author-
ized.9 A still further rule authorizes, in the discretion of the Court,
the appointment of a referee to superintend the inspection.10
The Civil Practice Act also provides that where reference is made
in a party's pleadings or affidavits to a document, any other party
may upon written notice require it be produced and a copy made.
The penalty for a failure to comply with the notice is the exclusion
of the document from evidence, unless it relates only to a defendant's
title, or cause be shown and deemed sufficient by the trial court
which may impose terms."
8N. Y. Civ. P1Ac. RiULE x40 provides: "Application for discovery. A party to
an action may apply to the court for an order requiring an adverse party to show
cause why he should not be compelled to produce and discover, or to give an in-
spection and copy of, or permission to take a copy or photograph of, a book,
document, paper, machine or other article, or to make a discovery of any article
or property, in his possession or under his control, relating to the merits of the
action or of the defense therein. Such order to show cause shall be granted on an
affidavit showing that the book, document, paper, machine, article or property
whereof discovery or inspection is sought is not inthe possession or under the control
of the party applying therefor but is in the possession or under the control of the
party against whom discovery or inspection is sought, or of his agent or attorney."
9N. Y. Civ. PRAc. RuLE 141 provides: "Hearing of application; order. On the
return of such order to. show cause, the court shall make such an order with
respect to the discovery or inspection prayed for as justice requires. The order for
discovery or inspection shall specify the time, place and manner in which it is to
be made. The order may stay any other proceedings in the action until such
order shall have been complied with or vacated."
'
0N. Y. Civ. PRAc. RULE 142 provides: "Referee to superintend discovery or
inspection. If discovery or inspection be directed, a referee may be appointed
by the order to direct and superintend it, whose certificate, unless set aside by
the court, is presumptive, and, except in proceedings for contempt, conclusive
evidence of compliance or non-compliance with the terms of the order."
'N. Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT, § 327. This section was applied by the Appellate
Division in Wile v. Nassau Smelting & Refining Works, 2o5 App. Div. 657, 200 N.
Y. Supp. 154 (Ist Dept. 1923). Section 328 enables a party to apply for an order
requiring his opponent to show by affidavit if written evidence is in the opponent's
possession and the facts as to the disposal of written evidence. This section is
strictly limited by the courts to documents referred to in the party's pleadings or
WRITTEN EVIDENCE IN NEW YORK
The Sections of the Civil Practice Act relating to examinations
before trial 2 also contain a provision that where a deposition is taken
pursuant to an order it may require the production of books and
papers in the possession of the party or person to be examined, and
upon the examination the books and papers or parts of them may be
offered in evidence in addition to being used by the witness to refresh
his memory.
The provision of Section 324 of the Civil Practice Act is that the
Court "may" compel the discovery and Rule 14o repeats the "may"
of the statute. Rule 141 says the Court "shall make such an order
with respect to the discovery or inspection prayed for as justice
requires." Thus the whole matter rests in the discretion of the Court.
The relief has usually been denied where there is a showing that the
books or documents may be brought to the trial by a subpoena duces
fecum.14 This limitation upon Section 324 is, however, unjustified.
As was pointed out in the early case of Duff v. Hutchinson,"5 time is
often necessary for the examination and consideration of evidence
and preparation for trial. This is especially true in the present era
of crowded calendars, long delays in reaching trial and necessarily
hurried trials. Justice may be more satisfactorily administered and
its efficiency maintained upon cases thoroughly prepared and capable
of decision on the merits than upon failures of proof.
Furthermore, productions by subpoenas duces tecum are generally
mentioned in cases which treat examinations before trial under
Article 29 of the Civil Practice Act as an alternative remedy to the
petition for discovery. In a large and increasing number of cases
at the motion terms the application under Section 3 24 is denied "with-
out prejudice to an application to examine the defendant before trial
when, if necessary, the books and papers may be demanded for the
purpose of refreshing the recollection of the witness." 6
affidavits. Schmoll Fils Associated v. Baltic America Line, 231 App. Div. 231,
247 N. Y. Supp. 305 (Ist Dept. 1931). This is entirely in accord with the legis-
lative intent.
1N. Y. CIV. PRAC. ACT, art. 29. 13N. Y. Civ. PRAC. ACT, § 296.
14Harbaugh v. Middlesex Securities Co., i1O App. Div. 633, 97 N. Y. Supp.
350 (Ist Dept. 19o6); Strauss v. Von Tobel, supra note 2; Ortman v. Bailey, 16o
App. Div. 258, 145 N. Y. Supp. 541 (Ist Dept. 1914); Klink v. Hershon, supra
note 2; Bencoe v. M'Donnell, supra note 5; Fabel v. Bierman Realty Corp.,
Special Term, Part I, New York County, reported in N. Y. L. J., July 25, 1931.
1531 Hun 639, 19 N. Y. Wdy. Dig. 20 (Ist Dept. 1884).
'
6Ortman v. Bailey, supra note 14; Rheims v. Bender, 185 App. Div. 61, 172
N. Y. Supp. 543 (2d Dept. 1918); Klink v. Hershon, supra note 2; Bencoe v.
M'Donnell, supra note 5; Clynne v. Scharf Bros. & Sons, supra note 2. These
cases are developments of formalism. They invite further motions on the same
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The provisions of Section 324 are entirely distinct and different
from those of Article 29. In New York City Car Advertising Co. v.
E. Regensburg & Sons1'7 it was held:
"In order to use the books and papers other than to refresh
the memory of the witness, however, an order of the court is
necessary. The use of books and papers produced pursuant to
an order for examination before trial or to a subpoena duces
tecum, is not to be confused with a discovery and inspection,
which now is provided for by section 324 of the Civil Practice
Act, aided by Rules 14o-142 of the Rules of Civil Practice."
Upon an examination before trial the examining party has no right
to either inspect or inform himself as to the contents of documents or
records under the cases cited. They may be used to refresh the
memory of the witness. There is no benefit of discovery. The partic-
ular record must be indicated and called for. On an examination
of a corporation before trial by its officer, entries in its minute books
may be relevant to the issues, but unless the examining party knows
-where the entry is located in the book he will find difficulty in getting
it before the court by an examination before trial. When found
through such examination, records may be offered in evidence if the
order for the examination so directs under Section 296.18
To deny discovery and inspection where it is shown that the writ-
ten evidence may be brought to the trial by a subpoena duces decum,
or to impose the technicalities which accompanied the old bill of
discovery or other technical rules, would seem to be unwarranted
limitations upon procedural rules enacted by the legislature with an
evident remedial purpose. This purpose and the desired effect of the
rules were stated in Bell v. Frank Gilbert Paper Company19 shortly
after their enactment. The court wrote, in part, as follows :P
subject matter. They increase and complicate procedure which should be simple
and direct. In Fey v. Wisser, 206 App. Div. 520, 202 N. Y. Supp. 3o (2d Dept.
1923) and Wertheim v. Grombecker, 229 App. Div. i6, 24o N. Y. Supp. 623
(3d Dept. i93o) formalism was swept aside and it was held that both examination
before trial and discovery and inspection might be joined in one motion.
172o5 App. Div. 705, 707, 20o N. Y. Supp. 152, 154 (1st Dept. 1923). See also
Ryan v. N. Y. Cent. & H. R. R., 124 App. Div. 34, io8 N. Y. Supp. 371 (3d
Dept. i9o8).
18A further limitation has developed with respect to a plaintiff's right to dis-
covery as to a defense or counterclaim on the theory that the burden of proof
rests on the defendant and it is no part of the plaintiff's case. But the onus
probandi often changes in a trial particularly where a party may by evidence
overcome the defense established. Bamberger v. United States Fidelity &
Guaranty Co., 37 Misc. 512, 75 N. Y. Supp. 1005 (Sup. Ct. 1902); De Koven v.
Ziegfield, 52 Misc. 93, ioi N. Y. Supp. 586 (Sup. Ct. 19O6). '9Supra note 5.
20Supra note 5, at 614-615, 193 N.Y. Supp. at 29. The Bell case was cited and
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"Rule 140 of the Rules of Civil Practice follows substantially
Rule 102 of the 'Rules of Court' proposed in the report of the
joint legislative committee on the simplification of civil prac-
tice, and which was presented to the legislature in 1919 and
which was required by the statute to be considered by the con-
vention in the formulation of its rules. See Report of Joint
Legislative Committee on the Simplification of Civil Practice,
1919, p. 1420.
The note at the end of the proposed rule 102 states that, 'The
general effect of the rule is to shift to the adverse party the
burden of showing that the discovery or inspection is not neces-
sary, instead of requiring the party applying for the order to
show the necessity in the first instance.' Such would seem to be
the clear intent and effect of the rule and such effect materially
changes the rules and force of decisions heretofore applied to
applications for discovery and inspection.
Books and documents are, therefore, permitted to be dis-
covered and inspected under the Civil Practice Act and the
Rules of Civil Practice, as justice requires, providing they
relate to the merits of the action."2'
The purpose of Section 324 was remedial and in the interests of
justice. The insistance upon this purpose will not only promote
justice but relieve the courts of the necessity of passing upon mo-
tions,2 avoid delay, and the seeking of unfair advantage by the pos-
sible suppression of evidence. The definite and sure administration of
justice will find support in the definite and sure application of reme-
dies directed to the disclosure of all evidence, and unnecessary litiga-
tion will be curtailed.
followed in Matter of Burton, 203 App. Div. 870, 196 N. Y. Supp. 919 (2d Dept.
1922) and in Burns v. Lipson, supra note 2. See also Wertheim v. Grombecker,
supra note 16. The Bell case cannot be said, however, to represent the general
attitude of the courts.
2
'Adequate power to enforce the production of written evidence is given by
Sections 325 and 405 of the Civ. PRAc. ACT through the dismissal of complaints
and striking out of answers. These sections are interpreted and applied in Fein-
gold v. Walworth Bros., 238 N. Y. 446, 144 N. E. 675 (1924), and Minneapolis,
St. P. & S. S. M. Ry. v. Alcohol Fuel and Molasses Co., 129 Misc. 908, 223 N. Y.
Supp. 395 (Sup. Ct. 1927).
uThe calendars and time of the various departments of the Appellate Division
as well as of the Special Terms are encroached upon by these motions because an
appeal is allowed of right.
